The German Communist Party (DKP), Socialism and the PR China

Deutsche Version

On March 17 – 19, 2023, the 25th Party Congress of the German Communist Party (DKP) took place. In addition to a discussion on the work in the DGB-trade unions1, focus was placed on a motion which, when passed, ultimately meant that the party’s Central Committee (CC) pushed through a line of support for Chinese capitalism: “China – state of the discussion: the PRC [People’s Republic of China, Translator’s note], its struggle to build a modern socialist country and changes in the international balance of power1“. The title already suggests many assumptions: First, that the discourse on the subject need be continued. Second, that the PRC is concerned with building “modern socialism.” Third, that there must be some sort of “modern socialism” which necessarily differs from Soviet socialism ( or as one must then name it, “outdated socialism”) in ways beyond accommodating for the advancement of technological development. Fourth, that the balance of power is changing on a global scale. With the exception of the last point, we must vehemently disagree – even our concurrence with the DKP’s final assertion will prove to be superficial upon evaluating and quantifying this change.

We see four main problems in the resolution, which we will outline in this critique:

  1. The understanding of socialism as a necessary step in throwing off the shackles of decaying imperialism and to develop through planning the efficient development of the productive forces has been – at least indirectly – abandoned.
  2. The imperialist world system tends to be equated with the West and its wars, leading to an illusory understanding of imperialism.
  3. The historical significance of the Sino-Soviet Split2 is downplayed, no analysis of this rupture is presented, no guilty parties are named, and the ideological problems that led to the rupture are not mentioned. Khrushchev revisionism as well as the revisionism of the CP of China are defended.
  4. The resolution is a definitive positioning regarding the PRC and the Communist Party of China (CPC). To declare this to be an “interim resolution” seems implausible, as it neither formulates open questions nor allows for the examination of any open positions. At the same time, the decision was made after short and rather unstructured discussion and debate.

In addition to the CC’s motion on the China question, the party congress also passed two other resolutions with a similar thrust: “Peace with China – Stop the hostilities against the PRC – Prevent the next big war!” and “12 points in the class struggle – Win the future! Never again war! 12 Points for Peace.” Thus, the DKP has directly adopted the Chinese government’s foreign policy plans as a demand to the German government. The DKP also demands to “keep industrial relations and supply chains stable” and to “seriously work for the preservation of the existing world economic system.”3 Similar formulations can also be found from within the ranks of the German monopoly associations.4 This also becomes evident in recent articles of the party newspaper Unsere Zeit (UZ)[Our Time, Tr. note], for example when Beate Landefeld praises the 12-point plan as a series of “guard rails” which ensure that “a highly internationally socialized production chain can be maintained, and global problems solved.”5 This represents nothing other than the maintenance of the imperialist world system under the presumably “more peaceful” auspices of Chinese foreign policy. The problematic consequences of the decision are already clearly evident here.

Problems in the China Decision

Abandonment of the goal of socialism

Lenin once called socialism “Soviet power plus electrification,” highlighting that the development of productive forces play a decisive role. However, in the imperialist stage of capitalism, this development can only take place to a limited extent without the politically and especially economically conscious and planned emergence of “Soviet power” – and thus of socialist relations of production. The present resolution detaches the “development of the productive forces” at several places in the text from the connection with the relations of production – the color of the cat that catches the mice here has obviously become irrelevant.6 The relations of production must be “flexibly adapted to the respective degree of the socialization of production.”

This expresses a false conception of the relationship between the development of productive forces and relations of production: In the epoch of imperialism, capitalism is in decay, productive forces become destructive forces, private appropriation of monopoly profit is opposed to the use of technical achievements in the interest of mankind.

Moreover, it remains unclear why a country with such a high degree of monopolization, unlike Russia shortly before the October Revolution, which was still partially feudal, or even China, which was still characterized by an agrarian economy and dominated by Japanese colonial rule, should have to continue to build up its productive forces before it is ripe for the uncompromising seizure of power by the proletariat. Yet how much longer must Chinese economic development “catch up” when it is already challenging the United States for pole position within the imperialist hierarchy (see next section)?

There are 6.3 million millionaires in China (USA: approx. 24.5 million).7 The figures for billionaires in China in 2023 vary between approx. 5008 and just under 1000.9 The figures for the USA of the corresponding sources vary between approx. 740 and 700. Of course, China has the larger population, but this is nevertheless a clear sign that internationally important monopolies are in the hands of the Chinese financial oligarchy. Yet the DKP speaks here of “Chinese socialism.” That there is an extensive market and capitalist ownership in China is not denied. Nor is this understood as a risky or questionable tactic; rather, the capitalist mode of production and far-reaching compromises with the bourgeoisie are described as inevitable for the construction of socialism: “In order to master these tasks, the Communist Parties were and are forced to make compromises with the class enemy. This includes allowing capitalist ownership in socialist countries.” As justification, reference is generally made to the historical “admission of capitalist property in socialist countries,” by which the very brief phase of the New Economic Policy (NEP) in the 1920s of the Soviet Union is presumably meant. The NEP in Russia, then still agrarian, allowed the peasants and the petty bourgeoisie a limited reintroduction of commodity production for less than a decade – something quite different than allowing the emergence of monopolies, as has been the case in China since at least the 1990s.

To claim that social planning and the anarchy of capitalist production are not mutually exclusive is not only to fall behind the experience of the Soviet Union and its monumental economic development, but to fall behind the most fundamental insights of Marx and Lenin, who clearly showed the path from the commodity to class society and to war – as soon as goods are produced, sold and bought as commodities, their production and distribution is determined by their exchange value and not by their use value. Commodity production promotes the formation of capital and thus the drive of capitalists to assert their interests. This drive can be fought in the superstructure, but it reasserts itself time and time again as long as the market exists. The program of the DKP of 2006 still holds to the insight that a socialist social formation means “a mode of production planned communally and responsibly according to scientific criteria and supported by solidarity” (p. 21).10 Instead of openly touting the market as a tool of opportunity in socialism, it states that in socialism “the possibility [must be] eliminated to subject society to the logic of profit” (p. 23) and that such socialism was possible for decades in the Soviet Union, among other places, “beyond the profit principle and according to a social plan” (p. 25). While we do not stand behind the 2006 program of the DKP, we introduce it here to illustrate the stronger and more open assertion of revisionist positions in its development.11 To claim that the market is necessary for the development of the productive forces means nothing other than that the previous understanding of socialism in the DKP is, with this resolution, moving away from seeing the necessity of overcoming the servitude of man by man and towards a willful continuation of the system of exploitation under other auspices, as is also shown in the classification of the 12-point plan of the party of China.

National conditions cannot be neglected in the construction of socialism, and yet there can be no socialism with Chinese characteristics, in which other economic laws apply and in which one could miraculously dispense with the central planning of production and the dictatorship of the proletariat. The culture, the treatment of religion and, to a certain extent, the legal system may be subject to certain differences, but certainly not with regard to the essential feature of socialism: production and distribution on the basis of democratically determined plans, on the basis of social ownership of the means of production.

It is also problematic that the resolution partially leaves open whether China is not yet socialist, meaning that socialism is under construction, or whether China is (still/already) socialist. This vagueness leads to a lack of clarity and begs critique. For example, the title speaks of “building a modern socialist country,” but it is clear from the rest of the text that a socialist society is assumed: For example, when it is written that the CP China has “resisted counterrevolution,” that “the CPC […] has so far sovereignly mastered its own country in preventing the bourgeoisie from developing into a class for itself,” that China is in “an initial stage of socialism,” that socialism in China is “not irreversible” – that there has been no interruption of socialism in recent decades.

The argumentation for classifying China as socialist ultimately abandons a materialist viewpoint on the development of socialism: Here, the rule of a communist party is cited, without, however, relating this to the intervening market mechanisms of the economic base or posing the question of whether this party, its goals, its practice and mode of organization can still be called communist in any way. Instead, in addition to high party and union membership, it seems sufficient for China to be classified as socialist, because the Chinese state intervenes in industry, commerce and finance to a greater extent than is the case in Western imperialist centers. In fact, this is simply a matter of the state acting as an ideal collective capitalist, which in China is particularly closely linked to monopoly capital.

The false assumption that a party calling itself “communist” in control of the state is sufficient to maintain a country’s socialism must, of course, have an impact on strategy: If government (participation) by a “Communist” party, even under the hegemony of a developed market, is determined to be a possible goal, the illusion of the DKP’s anti-monopolistic strategy is further reinforced. Thus, the example of China seems to make the path feasable that appropriate changes in the superstructure can lead to socialism (or to its preservation), even if monopolies continue to dominate the market of the respective country. The program of the DKP already names a cross-class coalition government as the next stage of development, and as a precondition for socialism (p.32). It does not help here that four pages later there is talk of a revolutionary break – after all, party members with different conceptions of strategy can refer to different, logically contradictory passages of the program, which is desired by centrists and de facto enables and promotes an anti-Leninist pluralism within the party.

Ultimately, it is only consistent to abandon the class struggle in principle not only nationally but also internationally: The central orientation for foreign policy is “peaceful coexistence,” the “cooperation of countries of different social orders.” This, far more than tactical peace, with the bourgeoisies of many countries is then declared to be the “precondition for progress in the international class struggle.” Thus, according to the resolution, before the struggle against imperialism can be taken up internationally, a condition must be reached which cannot exist under imperialism: peaceful coexistence amongst capitalist countries.

A false analysis of imperialism

How can it be explained that the DKP, with this resolution, assumes that the peaceful coexistence of capitalist states is possible within the imperialist system? The basis for this lies in a faulty analysis of imperialism, which falsely abridges Lenin’s analyses of the world-wide dynamics of the imperialist system and equates imperialism with a few Western countries: “countries hitherto dependent on imperialism”, “imperialism’s proxy war against Russia”. This conception is also reflected in the fact that Russia is understood as a country “external to imperialism”, i.e. “non-imperialist”, instead of recognizing that – due to the development of monopoly capital in Russia – the country’s capitalists must necessarily act according to the rules of the imperialist world system.

Accordingly, the BRICS alliance is also not understood as an imperialist alliance, nor the international expansion of Indian monopoly capital or the expansion of Brazil’s monopoly capital (alongside Mexico’s12) on the Latin American continent. Above all, of course, there is the expansion of China’s monopolies worldwide. As written in the previous section, China is in a neck-and-neck race with the U.S. for first place in the imperialist hierarchy13. This can be shown by looking at various metrics, although weighing them against each other is not always straightforward. For example, in its 2018 theses, the Turkish Communist Party (TKP) suggests that economic, political, military, and cultural-ideological aspects be taken into account for this purpose14. However, a comparison of the gross domestic product, adjusted for purchasing power and based on the population, the strength of the army, the international expansion of monopolies, the maturity of important areas of the development of productive forces such as semiconductor production and infrastructure projects, are important indicators. For example, the German think tank “Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik” (SWP) noted earlier this year that the Chinese economy (adjusted for purchasing power15) in 1990 was not even 1/6 of that of the U.S. and barely more than half of that of the Federal Republic of Germany; 30 years later, however, China’s economic output, adjusted for purchasing power, was about five times that of Germany and also well ahead of the U.S.16. In relation to the population, which is still much poorer on average in China, however, China’s purchasing power-adjusted gross-domestic product is only one third of that of the U.S.A.17. The research further shows that China’s foreign direct investment (FDI) capital inflows tended to overtake those of the U.S. in the late 2010s18. The largest Chinese newspaper itself, China Daily, notes that Chinese companies have dominated the list of the Fortune Global 500, the world’s 500 largest companies by revenue, since 2020, and in 2022 they overtook the U.S. by 145 companies19. As a trading country for imports and exports, China ranks high with South American countries, with about 20% in 202020. For some countries, such as Paraguay or Argentina, trade with China has already surpassed that with the U.S., based on data from the International Monetary Fund.21. In 2011, China had already signed free trade agreements with three Latin American countries22. For the time being, however, the U.S. remains the most important trading partner for most of Latin America.23. Among the countries that are part of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)24,China has been in third or fourth place among the member countries in terms of FDI in recent years25. China surpassed the U.S. as the largest trading partner of African countries as early as 200926, and as the largest trading partner of the EU in 202027. Thus, it can be stated that China’s trade and investments account for an increasing share worldwide, one which is replacing that of the US. This statement must be seen in combination with the previous argument that China is not socialist – after all, even the Soviet Union traded a lot with other countries; but in doing so, in the case of weaker countries, usually to their advantage. However, since China’s basis is a free-market, its current expansion must be seen as capital export in line with imperialist laws. Less aggressive imperialist influence by China in some parts of the world is a temporary, tactical approach, one which at the moment details the most promising expansion tactic of Chinese imperialism due to China’s market position and the specific geopolitical situation. This thus determines the appearance of Chinese foreign policy rather than its essence.

To classify China as socialist, despite all the points made so far, is dangerous. Suggesting that China’s monopoly capital can supposedly be restricted by the CP in such a way that it can lead to a “foreign policy directed toward the preservation of peace and economic development” foments an illusory understanding of imperialism. The impression created is that peaceful imperialism is possible, i.e. the existence of monopoly capital without the lawful enforcement of its interests through political or military means: “The Belt and Road Initiative enables many states to invest in infrastructure projects that are not oriented toward imperialist interests for the first time . Support and loans, unlike those influenced by imperialism, are not linked to interference in domestic affairs.” In this regard, the Chinese state usually couples infrastructure projects in other countries with Chinese corporations being involved in the construction, and also with corresponding loans. Infrastructure projects also sometimes meet with protests from capitalists and politicians in the target countries, who see their own interests restricted, for example with railroad construction in the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia between 2016 and 201928. China has also placed African countries such as Djibouti and Zambia in a clear debt dependency.29 Additionallry, there have been protests against China’s perceived dominance: demonstrations by Vietnamese and Filipino workers in over 20 provinces in Vietnam in 2014 which sought to counter the construction of oil rigs by Chinese companies in the area of islands in the South China Sea that belonged to Vietnam are some such examples. Similar disputes over sovereignty over islands in the South China Sea have also occurred, for example with Indonesia and other coastal countries in this region in 2016 30. The Chinese state particularly encourages investment in resource development by Chinese companies31, given China’s extreme dependence on resources such as chrome, iron and nickel.32. This focus on the development and import of raw materials has led, for example, to disputes with the Indonesian government a few years ago33. In the Philippines, too, there have been disagreements about the strategy of Chinese companies for mining regarding the property rights that the companies claimed34. In Myanmar, there have been cases where a significant portion of the energy projects built, such as pipelines and hydropower plants, have benefited China rather than the country in which they are built – in a few cases, up to 90 percent of electricity went to China35.

As such, the statement that China’s projects meet with popular and ruling-class approval in the relevant countries is only partially true.

The BRICS alliance comprises five of the world’s largest economies and will possibly expand in the next few years (notably to Algeria, Argentina, and/or Iran). The social formation of these countries and the necessity to exploit their own and other peoples which it carries is ignored by the DKP – instead, the alliance is cited as an example of the “policy of peaceful coexistence”, as oriented towards “equal economic cooperation.” Thus, in the end, the question of whether China is socialist no longer seems so relevant, if only because China’s multipolarity creates these supposed “gaps” for the international working class. Thus, while recognizing the increasing danger of war created by the current decline of the U.S. and China’s hegemonic aspirations, the resolution sees in this the possibility that the “capitalist countries can make themselves more independent of imperialism within the framework of a multipolar world order.” Here again, an incorrect conception of imperialism is shown: not as a world-wide system, which arises necessarily through the development of monopoly capital under capitalism, but as a worse variant of capitalist development, one which can be prevented by the “peaceful foreign policy” of China and other supposedly “non-imperialist” states.

While the resolution correctly states that an assessment of China is important, the DKP’s position will take the wrong side in the coming conflict between China and the USA: It will side with one of the states involved in an inter-imperialist conflict and thus will not represent the interests of the working class, but rather those of the corresponding bourgeoisie – as the DKP is already doing in the case of the war in Ukraine with its blatant support of Russia36, which is not even classified as socialist by the DKP.

The Sino-Soviet Split is downplayed in its importance, the problems of Maoism are ignored

Last but not least, the resolution downplays the achievements of China in its socialist stage, for example in ignoring the enormous development of the productive forces of earlier China and attributing this development to the later conversion to the capitalist mode of production, while also failing to acknowledge the corresponding break with socialism.

On the other hand, it also ignores the problematic ideas Mao had developed in the field of philosophy, imperialism, and socialism: a false and simplistic understanding of the nature of dialectical contradiction. In the question of imperialism, the class question was underemphasized in relation to the question of nations; the role of U.S. imperialism was at first exaggerated, but later it sought to ally with it against the Soviet Union. In the question of socialism, commodity production was advocated as an element of socialist development37. The resolution refers uncritically to Mao’s historical determination regarding which parts of the classes are part of the people. This favors current political objectives rather than a will to make a materialist analysis. The resolution also uses Mao’s concept of the “main contradiction” without further classification and thus adopts the corresponding thought construct that different contradictions are in the foreground depending on the political situation, which ultimately makes the contradiction between the exploiting and exploited classes in China a secondary matter. Instead, the focus is now on “the people’s growing need for a beautiful life.” The historical situation of Mao’s analyses – the extremely underdeveloped and semicolonial state of China before the revolution – is not taken into account.

Not a word is said about the problematic development of the People’s Republic of China after the Sino-Soviet Split: cooperation with U.S. imperialism including even the advocacy of the reunification of Germany under capitalist auspices38 and the suppression of the revolution in Portugal39.

To declare the resolution as an interim status is dishonest

At the penultimate party congress, it was decided that a continuation of the debate on China would be pursued in order to “meet questions, uncertainties and disagreements with debate”40 – without defining a position. Since then, there have also been voices against this line within the DKP: 27 party members, some of them well-known, jointly formulated a critique in December last year, partly supplemented by separate contributions to the discussion41. We welcome the criticism and support the effort, even if we consider it, in part, not far-reaching enough: Neither is the underlying understanding of imperialism sufficiently consistently criticized, nor is the connection between the DKP’s understanding of strategy and the described problems in the understanding of socialism explained.

There was also criticism of the lack of depth and scientific character in the discussion, also from the 27 members in question42. It seems that, despite a corresponding mandate to the CC, no intensive and scientific discussion took place. The discussion was visible in the party newspaper UZ, however, it was not structured coherently, but rather as a juxtaposition of positions. Overall, there were isolated positions, such as those of Harald Humburg at the beginning of January43 or by Helmut Dunkhase in December, which speak out against the impression that “socialism only becomes successful with market and private property”44. There are also isolated voices in favor of a more extensive clarification.45. Nevertheless, the positioning in favor of the efforts of the China motion clearly prevailed, especially through the supplementary articles published in the UZ alongside the discussion tribune: Whether in August the greeting of the chairman of the CPRF with the title “China is the guiding star of all mankind”46 , the documented speech of the DKP chairman to the Luxemburg-Liebknecht-Lenin weekend, which classifies China as “standing in the tradition” of the Soviet Union”47 or the uncommented publication of a statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China in February this year on the Ukraine war48.

Despite the in-depth discussion, there was nevertheless a large majority at the party congress in March of this year in favor of the clear positioning of the present resolution. The positions criticized here are thus not only the positions of the CC, they are actual majority positions in the DKP.

Anything publicly visible indicates that the DKP will no longer deviate from the position it has now adopted. The decision on China is not a break in the development of the DKP; rather, it is the logical consequence of recent developments and conforms to the revisionist ideas of imperialism and strategy that have characterized the party since its founding. This raises the suspicion that the classification of the decision as an intermediate position is primarily intended to retain party members in the spirit of centrism despite serious ideological differences.


Some comrades with Marxist-Leninist positions continue to cling to the hope that the direction of the DKP’s development might change in the future. We cannot see any indications that justify such a hope. We consider it an delusion, dangerous in that it leads to the waste of energy and time within a structure that will almost certainly no longer be transformed into a communist party. The 25th Party Congress was a clear step to the right, the strengthening of revisionism and a further negation of the communist character of the party. The orientation toward the CPC’s party line and the strategic orientation toward a “socialist” market economy must now be considered definitive, at the latest.

In 201849 and also in 2020 for their 23rd party congress50,we have criticized the DKP’s analysis of China. Many of us left the DKP in 2017 with a critique that is partly expressed again in this text. Since we left, the revisionist positions in the DKP have become even clearer and more consolidated, publicly visible discussions about a revolutionary strategic orientation have apparently left the party with us. We see ourselves strongly confirmed in our 2017 decision by the current development. We consider it almost impossible that we could have stopped the further development of the DKP towards revisionism by remaining in the party, given our weakness at that time. The modest but quite relevant successes we have made since then in building a new communist party would have been impossible had we not made the decision to leave the DKP at that time.

We value the historical heritage of the DKP, have great respect for all comrades who did not let the counterrevolution turn them away from communism, and remain ready for any discussion. With the China decision in its unambiguity, however, it has become even clearer that the DKP will no longer become a revolutionary communist party in the foreseeable future.

We see the immense difficulties of building a new party and have experienced them ourselves for years, but our experience is also that concrete and tangible progress is possible and that a revolutionary communist party in Germany need not be a distant vision of the future. The building of such a party will – unfortunately – only be possible outside the DKP.


2 The relationship between the Soviet Union and China continued to be one of solidarity for longer after the end of the 1950s; the Soviet Union supported the Chinese revolution for decades by supplying weapons, training soldiers, and finally, in World War II, by fighting fascist Japan and thus binding these forces. From the end of the fifties on, however, an ideological development away from each other became more and more obvious. With some correct criticisms by Mao of Khrushchev’s illusions in the peace ability of imperialism, however, the theory and practice of socialist China strayed further and further, until finally in the seventies the Soviet Union was seen as the greatest enemy and on the other side a rapprochement with the imperialists took place, up to the advocacy of the reunification of the FRG under capitalist auspices. We intend to present this development in a more in-depth analysis, which will be published in the coming months.

3 Item 11 of the Chinese government’s 12-point plan:

PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “China’s Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis,” IP, February 24, 2023

4 BDI, “Asia-Pacific Committee of German Business: German Government’s China Strategy, Jan. 11, 2023”Risks to industrial supply chains and national security [are] to be reduced.”

5 Beate Landefeld, “Travels to Beijing,” UZ , April 14, 2023

6 In 1991, in connection with the introduction of a market economy in China, Deng Xiaoping, then chairman of the CCP, coined the phrase “it doesn’t matter whether the cat is black or white, the main thing is that it catches mice” ( – this expressed the view that more efficient production was possible as a result of the market economy mode of production, as a result of the replacement of socialism by capitalism in China, and that this must be the deciding factor in the end.




10 DKP, Program, adopted April 8, 2006,

11 Unfortunately, many of our articles in the relevant debate at the time are no longer online. For example, these included:

Bob Oskar, “With Stages to Socialism? On Some Ambiguities, Errors, and Inconsistencies in Blach and Rodermund’s Discussion Paper,” 2017.

Jona Textor, “The Myth of a Variant of Anti-Monopolistic Strategy Untainted by Reformism,” 2017,

Thanasis Spanidis, Jona Textor, Bob Oscar, Antonio Veiga, “What are the discussions in DKP and SDAJ about?”, 2017.

12 Statista, ” Sales revenue of major companies headquartered in Latin America in 2020,” August 2021 Descending order – Petrobras (Brazil), JBS (Brazil), América Movil (Mexico), Pemex (Mexico), Vale (Brazil)…

13 For more detailed classification see, e.g.: Bob Oskar, “Russia’s Imperialist War,”, April 16, 2022

Pablo Medina, “Unipolar World?”,, April 15, 2022,

KO, “Power Shifts in the Imperialist Pyramid in the “Corona Crisis,”” 5/26/2020, Power Shifts in the Imperialist Pyramid in the “Corona Crisis” | Communist Organization.

Thanassis Spanidis, “The discussion on the class character of the PRC: an expression of the ideological crisis of the world communist movement,” Dec. 04, 2017 The discussion on the class character of the PRC: an expression of the ideological crisis of the world communist movement | Communist Organization

14 TKP, “Theses on Imperialism along the Axis of Russia and China,” Communist. Org, September 10, 2021, originally published 2017

15 for an explanation see for example here:

16 Maul, “U.S. and China on a Collision Course – the Importance of Domestic Politics for the Bilateral Relationship,” SWP, 7 Mar. 2023,

17 Statistic Times, “Comparing United States and China by Economy,” 5/15/2021,

18 Source is the World Bank data

19 Helen Han, “China still growth engine of world economy,” China Daily, 1.3.2023,

20 Felipe Larraín et. Al, “China’s Evolving Presence in Latin America,” January 3, 2023

21 Latinometrics, “Will China Become LatAm’s Largest Trade Partner?” Aug. 15, 2022,

22 Jenkins, Rhys. “China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Latin America: What Has Changed?” Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 51.1 (2022): 13-39.

23 Liang, W. Pulling the Region into its Orbit? China’s Economic Statecraft in Latin America. Journal of Chinese Political Science on Late 24, 433-449 (2019).

24 Association of Southeast Asian Nations, founded in 1967 by the four countries Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore, today 10 member states – comparable to the EU in terms of area and population.

25 The ASEAN Secretary, “ASEAN Investment Report 2020-2021,” Sept. 30, 2021, p.5.

26 Deych, T. L. “China in Africa: A Case of Neo-Colonialism or a Win-Win Strategy?” Контурыглобальныхтрансформаций: политика, экономика, право (2019): 63-82.


28 Camba, Alvin. “Derailing development: China’s railway projects and financing coalitions in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines.” Boston: Boston University, Global Development Policy Center, GCI Working Paper 8 (2020).

29 Stengl, Anton: China’s New Imperialism : A Formerly Socialist Country Rescues the Capitalist World System. Vienna: Promedia Verlag, 2021.

30 Cecilia Han Springer, “Energy Entanglement: New Directions for the China-Indonesia Coal Relationship,” in In China’s Backyard, 2017.

31 Cecilia Han Springer, 2017

32 Yu Hongyuan, “Mineral resources in China’s “Peripheral” diplomacy,” in In China’s backyard, 2017.

33 Han Springer 2017

34 Alvin A. Camba, “The Direction, Patterns, and Practices of Chinese Investments in Philippine Mining,” in In China’s backyard, 2017.

35 Andrews-Speed, Qiu, Len, ” “Mixed Motivations, Mixed Blessings: Strategies and Motivations for

Chinese Energy and Mineral Investments in Southeast Asia,” in In China’s backyard, 2017.

36 See, for example, the following statement co-signed by the DKP:

37 We will publish a more detailed analysis of this in the coming months.

38 Translated from English: “Yes, we are in favor of reunification,” Memorandum of Conversation between Mao Zedong and Henry A. Kissinger, October 21, 1975.

39 Translated from English: ” Yes, and now Portugal seems to be more stable. It seems to be better”, Memorandum of Conversation between Mao Zedong and Gerald R. Ford, 2.12.1975.

40 DKP Party Congress, “Debate on the People’s Republic of China,” 23 Mar. 2020,

41 Paul Rodermund, “Beerdigung unseres Sozialismusverständnisses,” UZ, December 2, 2022.

Lukas Zeise, “System Competitor China,” UZ, December 9, 2022

42See, e.g.,

43 Harald Humburg, “What the Five-Year Plan Tells Us,” UZ, January 6, 2023

44 Helmut Dunkhase, “the future lies elsewhere,” UZ, December 23, 2022,

Other critical contributions, for example: Noam Wood,

45 Harry Hoppe, “Thorough Clarification Needed,” UZ, February 3, 2023,

46 Gennady Zyuganov, Chairman of the CC of the CPRF, “China is the guiding star of all mankind,” UZ, August 5, 2022

47 Patrick Köbele, “Frieden Begegnung mit Russland und China!”, Speech at the Luxemburg-Liebknecht-Lenin Meeting of the DKP in Berlin, UZ, January 16, 2023

48 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “China’s Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis,” IP, Feb. 24, 2023

49Jakob Schulze, “Offener Brief an Patrik Köbele, Vorsitzender der DKP, KO, 15.08.2018, Open Letter to Patrik Köbele, Chairman of the DKP | Communist Organization.

50KO, “On Some Problems and Ambiguities of the Leading Motion to the 23rd Party Congress of the DKP”, 10.02.2020, On Some Problems and Ambiguities of the Leading Motion to the 23rd Party Congress of the DKP | Communist Organization

1 Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, an umbrella-organization of eight major trade unions with about six million members. (Translator’s note)